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THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM
COMPENSATION FUND: A CIRCUMSCRIBED
RESPONSE OR AN AUSPICIOUS MODEL?
Robert L. Rabin*
INTRODUCTION
This Article will pursue an exercise in speculative thinking. What
are the implications for the future, if any, of the September 11th Vic-
tim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the Fund)? Although the tort op-
tion was not foreclosed for the victims of September 11th, Congress
made a serious effort to provide incentives that would channel claims
into the no-fault compensation scheme established by the Air Trans-
portation Safety and System Stabilization Act (the Act).1 Having
done so, it nonetheless seems safe to say that Congress, acting little
over a week after the event and subject to great pressure both to sal-
vage the airline industry and offer solace to a community of victims,
was not thinking broadly about the relationship between the Fund and
future generations of prospective tort claimants. At this distance from
the event, however, there is every reason to reflect on whether the
Fund, established in the turmoil following the most riveting single-
event mass disaster in the nation's history, should be regarded as a
singular response or as a window for thinking about redress of future
victims of terrorist activity-or even, perhaps, victims of criminal vio-
lence more generally.
I will begin by offering a set of building blocks: three scenarios of
terrorist activity considered from the vantage point of recovery in tort.
Initially, I will briefly revisit the scenario arising out of the events of
September 11th. Then, I will vary the circumstances to consider the
consequences of an incident involving fatalities and serious injuries
from destruction of a major site such as a sports arena or tourist at-
traction. And finally, I will discuss "localized," or small-scale, acts of
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks to Barrett Hester and
Suzanne Bratis for research assistance, and to Marc Franklin, Alex Stein, and Steve Sugarman
for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(b)(2),
115 Stat. 230, 238 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 40101 (West 2003), [hereinafter
Air Transportation Safety Act].
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terror with destructive consequences. I will look at all of this from a
tort perspective.
Next, I will shift ground to no-fault as an option for addressing
these various types of claims, grounding my discussion in a brief reca-
pitulation of the September 11th scheme. The critical point here at
the threshold, however, is recognition that the Fund is not really one
model, but three: 1) the model that can be gleaned from the statute
enacted by Congress in the immediate aftermath of the events, 2) the
model that emerges from the regulatory gloss provided by the Special
Master, and 3) the model in action as it emerges from the pattern of
reparations actually provided by the Special Master in the implemen-
tation of the scheme. I will limit myself to the first two models be-
cause it remains too early to assess and generalize about the third.
But it would be unduly narrow to remain within the confines of the
Fund model, or models, in thinking about the no-fault option for ter-
rorist-type incidents. So, I will offer some context by discussing
briefly a limited number of alternative no-fault strategies that have
been employed in offering redress to the victims of terrorist acts, and
more broadly, to victims of criminal violence. This broader look will
not only offer more in the way of contrasting options to tort, but
should reflect on the underlying inquiry of the Article as well; that is,
whether the Fund approach offers a sensible alternative to tort for
victims of terrorism or other acts of violence.
Finally, I will move from the proverbial vantage point of the trees to
that of the forest. For the most part, the discussion to this point will
have focused on the comparative claims for addressing terrorist and
similar violence-provoked harms from perspectives of tort and no-
fault. But this has ignored a more fundamental question: Can a satis-
fying principle be articulated for treating those suffering injuries from
terrorist acts as a distinct category of beneficiaries? Once again, the
question needs to be broken down into sub-inquiries. Mass terrorist
activities such as occurred on September 11th, on the one hand, and
localized incidents, on the other, do not necessarily present equally
compelling cases for supplanting tort as a remedial scheme. In the
end, I will contend, fairness considerations suggest less the normative
superiority of tort for addressing every manner of personal injury,
than the problematic nature of affording special status to victims of
terrorism as no-fault claimants, whether in mass calamities or in iso-
lated incidents.
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II. INJURIES FROM TERRORIST ACTS: THREE SCENARIOS IN TORT
A. Reprise on September 11th
Consider the tragic events of September 11th in the absence of the
subsequent enactment of the Fund-from the perspective of tort, in
other words. At the outset, it is striking that insolvency emerges as
the threshold issue rather than the prospects for successfully establish-
ing liability. Indeed, more than any other single factor, insolvency
concerns explain the alacrity with which Congress acted to set up the
Fund and limit liability in tort to the insurance coverage of the princi-
pal potential defendants. 2
Although striking, the threshold consideration of insolvency is not
particularly surprising. In this era of mass tort-provoked bankrupt-
cies, most notably perhaps in the asbestos industry, insolvency con-
cerns are frequently far more salient than doctrinal liability issues in
evaluating the capacity of tort to respond, from either a fairness or an
efficiency perspective, to claims for redress. In short, if the sheer pros-
pect of tort liability for some 3,000 deaths and many additional serious
injuries-leaving aside the staggering property loss claims-could
have sufficed to throw major players in the airline industry into bank-
ruptcy, triggering a serious shortfall in compensation to victims, as
well as all of the attendant economic dislocations that would have en-
sued for the nation's economy, the tort system could well be viewed as
inadequate to the task of handling the aggregate personal injury toll of
September 11th.3
If, however, solvency considerations are put aside, and one assumes
that the airline industry (and other potential defendants) stayed the
course-doggedly contesting all claims in tort, along the model of the
tobacco industry-what might the consequences have been? Once
again, the major consideration arguably turns out to be other than a
liability question. The liability issues, as I will indicate immediately
below, are contestable. But that is precisely the point. A long and
bitter contest over liability, stretching out over a period of years, in
which families of September 11th victims had nothing beyond recrimi-
nations, bitterness, and frustrations with "the system," almost cer-
tainly would have been regarded as intolerable to the national
community.
2. Note the title of the Act itself, the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.
See Air Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 408(a); Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201(b)(2), 115 Stat. 597, 645-46 (2001).
3. For a discussion of how this problem has affected asbestos litigation, see Lisa Girion, Firms
Hit Hard as Asbestos Claims Rise; Court: Recent Jury Awards Underscore Commercial Disaster's
Continuing Toll, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at Al.
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By contrast, the ordinary frustrations over delay and uncertainty
engendered by the tort system are atomized into case-by-case contests
over product defects, premises liability, professional malpractice, or
negligence on the road, rather than concentrated into a community of
grievance over a single horrific event. These claims are settled for the
most part because the stakes do not warrant protracted litigation
costs. And most strikingly, they do not have the emotional resonance
and empathy engendered nationwide for the victims of September
11th. Again, these considerations were reflected in the Fund, which
not only provided for no-fault recovery to avoid extended arguments
about responsibility, but also created a fast-track system that put a
premium on resolving claims with a reasonable degree of speed.4
The two prominent secondary effects of tort discussed so far-po-
tentially catastrophic financial consequences to a critical industry and
heightened emotional resonance of a singular victim group-are con-
siderations to which I will return in the discussion of alternatives to
tort liability, such as the Fund. For the present, I simply note that the
former consideration (potentially catastrophic financial consequences)
is not unprecedented. For example, statutory schemes limiting liabil-
ity in tort for the nuclear power industry and vaccine manufacturers
were enacted in response to just such liability concerns. 5 On the other
hand, the nationwide identification with the distress of the September
11th survivors was arguably without precedent. Contrast, on that
score, the far more abstract sympathy for asbestos and auto rollover
victims. These latter types of injury victims are obviously the subject
of public sympathy and regret. But the reaction of the public to the
daily reporting of isolated tragic events is fleeting; to a certain extent,
we are inured to the everyday background risks of life, even when
they come to fruition. The question, as we encounter other violence-
inspired scenarios and reparation systems in the discussion that fol-
4. See Air Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, §§ 405(b)(3), 406(a).
5. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Com-
pensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 955 (1993) (commenting that Congress passed the Price-
Anderson Act, which provided coverage for nuclear energy-related accidents, "with the express
intent of encouraging investment in nuclear energy research and operations by a private sector
daunted by the prospect of multimillion dollar claims and a constrained insurance market"); id.
at 958 (explaining that Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 "in
response to concerns of the vaccine manufacturers, who had threatened to withdraw from the
market because of anxieties about the possibility of crushing liability resulting from the infre-
quent but unavoidable injuries from exposure to vaccines"); see also National Swine Flu Immu-
nization Program of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k) (1976) (amending the Federal Tort
Claims Act to allow those injured by the swine flu vaccine to bring suit against the federal gov-
ernment rather than manufacturers or distributors of the vaccine).
[Vol. 53:769
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lows, will be how far the distinctive reaction to September 11th carries
over.
Turning to liability issues for the events of September 11th, the
prospects for recovery would have been uncertain. 6 Viewed from the
context of a similar event in the future, the most prominent feature of
the September 11th attack-and indeed of tort liability for terrorist-
initiated events generally-is the proximate cause dimension of the
cases: that the terrorists, not the defendants, were the immediate per-
petrators of the harm.? But, of course, this is not a conclusive defense
for third-party "enablers": premises owners are often responsible for
the violent acts of criminal intervenors, as are those who set the stage
for reckless road accidents by absentmindedly leaving keys in the igni-
tion of their unlocked cars, to name just two of many third-party re-
sponsibility scenarios.8
Foreseeability, a highly flexible concept, is often the byword here.
In the case of the airlines, there is certainly a respectable argument for
negligence liability to passengers for an inadequately secured flight
deck that allowed the terrorists to gain control of the plane. 9 Even
though that hazard has now been addressed through retrofitting and
design change, there is undoubtedly the future prospect that, viewed
from hindsight in a tort action, some shortfall of precautionary con-
duct-perhaps by flight attendants on board, or in a failure of screen-
ing machinery, if evidence were available-might establish a sufficient
case to get beyond summary dismissal to a presumably sympathetic
jury.'0
In short, there is no doctrinal block in tort law-either in the con-
text of September 11th or a similar future event-if the terrorist activ-
ity in downing the airplanes, with mass loss of life, is dissociated from
the 2,500 additional deaths resulting from the destruction of the World
6. One cannot simply look at the resolution of opt-out tort claims under the Fund to assess
how tort would have operated in the absence of the Fund. First, the opt-out claims will be a
highly selective sub-set of all potential tort claims in the absence of the Act. Second, the claims
will be litigated under the constraints imposed by the Act; in particular, the caps on aggregate
recovery.
7. Recently enacted federal antiterrorism legislation has led to growing litigation against ter-
rorist organizations and their supporters; see, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000
(7th Cir. 2002); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003); Smith ex
rel. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
8. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999).
9. Along the same lines, a plausible case could be made on a design defect theory against the
airline manufacturers.
10. In the event, there might also have been responsibility for the airport screeners, although
in formal doctrinal terms they were independent contractors, rather than employees. But this
pathway to airline liability is now closed because airport security has been taken over by the
federal government. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44901(a)-(b) (West 2003).
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Trade Center and damage at the Pentagon. Tragically, commercial
airline crashes occur on occasion, and the tort system deals with the
resulting passenger fatalities in a reasonably efficient fashion that has
withstood any serious effort to replace tort with no-fault recovery.
Unless airline terrorism turned into a nightmare scenario of recurrent
tragedy, there is no reason to conclude that tort law would be inade-
quate to the task of addressing these claims, either from the perspec-
tive of financial consequences to the industry or because of some
doctrinal shortcoming.
The missing piece in the portrait of September 11th, of course, is the
human devastation suffered in the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon, in addition to the loss of life on the airlines. For the survivors of
those who perished in the buildings, the prospects for recovery in tort
would be somewhat more attenuated. With respect to the airlines,
foreseeability is perhaps stretched beyond its limit. Even from a hind-
sight view, it is one thing to charge the airlines with knowledge that a
hijacking accomplished through inadequate security measures might
result in fatalities to passengers on the plane. In this regard, the requi-
site foreseeability does not even require that terrorists necessarily be
anticipated as the intervenors; the mere prospect of aggrieved or mal-
adjusted passengers who might "foreseeably" attempt to take over the
plane would suffice for purposes of defeating the claim of no proxi-
mate cause. It is quite another matter to require anticipation that the
hijackers would deliberately crash the plane into a building causing
death and serious injury to the occupants.11
In fact, the building occupants' claims explore a supplementary
route as well-claims against the building owners.12 Once again, the
criminal intervention suggests a proximate cause defense: the building
owner could argue that there was no reason to anticipate that airline
hijackers would crash planes into the buildings. Focusing only on the
specifics of the World Trade Center scenario itself, however, earlier
terrorist action had been targeted at the structure, and a limited num-
ber of fatalities had resulted. 13 So a counter to the proximate cause
defense would be that there was reason to foresee an attack on the
building complex, even if the specifics of an airline hijacking could not
be conjured up as the medium.
11. In the initial stage of the litigation, motions to dismiss claims brought by survivors and
property owners against the airlines, airport security companies, owners and operators of the
World Trade Center, and aircraft manufacturers, were denied. See In re September 11 Litiga-
tion, 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
12. The building owners are co-defendants, as noted, in the ongoing litigation. Id.
13. See Ralph Blumenthal, Core Group in Bombing Plot Identified, Authorities Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1993, at Al.
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From this posture, however, the critical issue becomes one of build-
ing structural risks, and the focal point in tort changes to cause-in-fact
rather than proximate cause. The issue is whether any reasonably
available structural or design measures might have been taken that
would have withstood the impact of the terrorist-initiated airline
crashes. Studies have, in fact, been undertaken to determine whether
the World Trade Center could and should have been designed or re-
trofitted at reasonable cost to withstand the attack of September
11th. 14 From a plaintiff's perspective, this tort pathway is a costly,
protracted, and indeterminate affair at best.15
This brief expedition into doctrinal territory can only take us so far.
As it happens, it does not tell the whole story. The scenic backdrop is
missing-the nationwide psychological response to September 11th.
To be concrete, suppose, not implausibly, that the airline victims were
able to make out sufficiently strong claims to avoid dismissal on the
merits, but that the building occupants were not able to make out col-
orable claims, whether on proximate cause or cause-in-fact grounds,
that might proceed to trial. Without the emotional overlay of Septem-
ber 11th, this is a set of circumstances-disparate treatment of some-
what similarly situated classes of victims-that ordinarily in tort leads
to line-drawing in the name of minding the "floodgates of litigation."
By way of illustration, consider Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.,16 a
landmark New York Court of Appeals decision in a case arising out of
the 1977 New York City blackout that left the city in the dark for an
extended period of time and contributed to a wide array of personal
injuries, property losses, and strains on municipal services. 17 In
Strauss, the New York court held that a plaintiff, injured by a fall in
the dark, was owed no duty of due care by Con Edison, the errant
electric power provider, because he was not in privity of contract with
the defendant-rather, it was his landlord who paid the electric bill.1 8
By contrast, those in privity who were injured as a consequence of the
defendant's established gross negligence were allowed to recover. 19
14. James Glanz, Towers Untested for Major Fire, Inquiry Suggests: Victims Relatives Angry,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at Al.
15. Firefighters and rescue workers could face additional legal barriers because of the tradi-
tional bar on tort suits resulting from negligence under the firefighters' rule. Although New
York has partially abrogated the rule by statute, recovery still appears to be premised on an
injury related to a statutory violation by the defendant. See Guiffrida v. Citibank Corp., 790
N.E.2d 772 (N.Y. 2003).
16. 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985).
17. Id. at 38.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 429 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1981).
2003]
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I make reference to Strauss not as an admirable instance of judicial
line-drawing, but rather as an illustration of "sorting" similarly-situ-
ated victims of a single calamitous event that is typically undertaken
by the courts without note in the outside community. My larger point
is to contrast September 11th and to suggest that if tort were to have
led down this path in responding to September 11th claims, parsing
victims into sub-classes of deserving and non-deserving, it would have
seriously undermined the legitimacy of the system.
In this regard, we come full circle back to the special character of
September 11th. While Julius Strauss was a victim in common with
others, the New York City blackout did not create the public percep-
tion of a community of victims. The tort system's particularized man-
ner of viewing each claim in a sequentially-related series of harms-
sorting cases in relational plaintiff-defendant terms-leads to arguably
intolerable outcomes in the case of September 11th fatalities: airplane
passengers might recover but building occupants might not because of
causation refinements intrinsic to tort doctrine. Perhaps, in fact, Pen-
tagon victims and those in the World Trade Center sort out differently
for liability purposes once structural design questions are resolved.
To recapitulate then, the tort system-had it been imposed upon
September 11th victims as the only game in town, rather than offered
as an option to no-fault recovery in the Act that victims were free to
take or leave-can be regarded as wanting on three distinct grounds,
none of which is an indictment of the doctrinal framework of tort lia-
bility rules in itself.20 First, the very real prospect of insolvency means
that the system would have promised far more than it could deliver,
particularly when the corresponding claims for property damage were
added to the aggregate mix. Second, the intrinsic character of the tort
process for resolving complex factual and legal issues might well have
led to protracted litigation that would have imposed financial and
emotional stress on a community of victims whose vulnerabilities were
of unparalleled concern to the public. And third, the systemic charac-
ter of victim sorting in tort might have led to perceptions of arbitrari-
ness because of the character of September 11th victims-distinct
from most tort victim classes-as a community with a special identity
demanding similar treatment for liability purposes. I will next discuss
whether these considerations spill beyond the bounds of a September
11th-type event, or whether still other factors suggest a problematic
response from tort.
20. As a background consideration, it is not entirely accurate to treat tort as "the only game in
town." For those victims who were killed or injured in the course of their employment, presum-
ably workers' compensation benefits would be available.
[Vol. 53:769
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B. Targeting Heavily Populated Sites
Based on the searing experience of September 11th, a terrorist at-
tack on a heavily populated site or event-a stadium sports activity,
holiday parade, major tourist attraction, or transport area where large
crowds congregate-might well raise similar pressures to replace tort
law with no-fault compensation. This is particularly so in light of the
expectations that may be a consequence of the establishment of the
Fund itself.2 ' But then again, there might not be a parallel response;
historically, there has been strong political resistance to adopting (or
extending) ad hoc no-fault schemes. 22
Even apart from September 11th, however, the popular reaction to
a Bhopal-type disaster is sharply different from the accidental gas leak
that claims a handful of victims. Perhaps in part because of the wider
publicity of a mass disaster, and also partially because of the shock-
effect of large numbers of victims, the demand for some systemic re-
sponse to mass injury is sharper. The imprint of terrorism on the na-
tional psyche may only serve to enhance this reaction. In the absence
of a legislative compensation scheme, would the default system of tort
satisfy what may very well be a strong impulse to afford
compensation?
It may be useful to distinguish here between public and private
spheres of responsibility for safeguarding against acts of terrorism.
Many of the sites that have raised heightened concerns in the ongoing
series of terrorist alerts-airports and urban subway stations, bridges
and nuclear power plants-are dominantly policed and patrolled by
public safety agencies.2 3 To the extent that any security failure arose
21. As a thought experiment, suppose the Oklahoma City bombing had occurred just after
September l1th. It is certainly plausible to think that Congress would have extended benefits to
victims comparable to the Fund scheme. Nonetheless, with the passage of time, even if Septem-
ber llth maintains some resonance as a precedent for compensating victims of a mass act of
terrorism, the particular design features of the Fund, discussed infra at notes 34-50, become less
compelling.
22. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. Rev. 13 (1988). Although federal no-fault schemes for asbestos have been proposed
in the past, no such proposal has ever been enacted. Asbestos no-fault legislation currently
under consideration by Congress may end this trend. Congress has also recently acted to pro-
vide compensation for health care workers and emergency personnel injured or killed by small-
pox vaccinations. See Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
20, §§ 1-3, 117 Stat. 638, 639-49.
23. For a discussion of the concerns relating to nuclear power plants as the potential targets of
terrorist attacks, see Glen Martin, Diablo Canyon Power Plant a Prime Terror Target; Attack on
Spent Fuel Rods Could Lead to Huge Radiation Release, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 17, 2003, at Al. This
article describes how terrorist attacks against nuclear power plants could cause devastating dam-
age resulting from the release of huge amounts of radiation. Spent nuclear fuel storage pools
could present particularly attractive targets. At the Diablo Canyon power plant in California,
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out of an alleged inadequate provision of policing resources, the
claims almost certainly would fail under tort law. Similarly, allega-
tions of an intelligence failure on the part of public agencies-familiar
allegations to observers of the unfolding post-event investigative ac-
counts of the circumstances leading up to September 11th24-would
undoubtedly be regarded as outside the domain of judicial review
through tort law. Although public agencies can no longer claim blan-
ket immunity from tort liability, highly discretionary functions, such as
allocating personnel resources to crime prevention and engaging in
intelligence-gathering activities, remain shielded from tort responsibil-
ity on the overlapping grounds of separation of powers and institu-
tional competence. 25
But what of a terrorist attack at a major sports or entertainment
event, where large crowds are in attendance, or at a visible and possi-
bly symbolic site (particularly to foreign terrorists) like Disneyland?
At these sites, managed under private auspices, security is a mix of
public and private. Perhaps not surprisingly, private enterprise activ-
ity has never been afforded broad discretionary immunity, parallel to
public policing agencies. A baseball club that failed to safeguard visit-
ing team fans from home team supporters' exuberance that spilled
over into violent personal attacks would not escape liability for inade-
for example, the forty-foot-deep spent-fuel storage pools contain more radiation than the two
active reactor cores but are not protected by the same kind of containment structure as the
reactors. If a terrorist attack caused the water in the pools to drain away, the exposed spent fuel
assemblies would catch fire and send massive amounts of radiation into the air, rendering an
area the size of New Jersey uninhabitable. Methods of attack could include commercial and
private aircraft, commando assaults, truck bombs, and anti-aircraft missiles. Guards at Diablo
Canyon are armed with semi-automatic rifles and 9mm pistols. Since September 11th, 2001, the
California Highway Patrol has also been providing additional twenty-four hour security at
Diablo Canyon. Id.
Claims resulting from nuclear accidents would be covered by the federal Price-Anderson Act,
which was originally passed in 1957 to promote private investment in nuclear power by capping
the amount nuclear plant owners would have to pay if a nuclear accident occurred. The cover-
age provided by Price-Anderson includes incidents caused intentionally by theft or sabotage.
See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief
Funds, available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmldoc-collections/fact-sheets/funds.html (last
visited Sept. 4, 2003).
24. See, e.g., David Johnston, Report of 9/11 Panel Cites Lapses by C.LA. and F.B.IL, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2003, at Al. See also Douglas Jehl, The Struggle for Iraq; Intelligence, Senate
Panel Demands C.IA. Data Leading Up to Iraq War by Friday Noon, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 30, 2003,
at A14.
25. See, e.g., Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1987) (reiterating from prior
case law the need for a "special relationship" to establish a duty of police protection, and articu-
lating limiting factors for the test of whether such a relationship exists). At the national level,
the Federal Tort Claims Act contains a special exception for discretionary functions from the
general waiver of U.S. governmental immunity for negligent acts. See Berkovitz v. United
States, 486 U.S. 531, 535-40 (1988).
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quate supervision of the situation by claiming, on resource allocation
grounds, that its business decision to hire a limited number of private
security guards was shielded from second-guessing in tort suits.
Rather, if the ball club were to prevail, it would be on the case-
specific grounds that it had exercised due care under the circum-
stances. But the foreseeability of case-specific terrorist attacks in al-
most any given arena of public entertainment will always remain
virtually nil. As a consequence, even without blanket immunity, pri-
vate liability would probably be the exceptional case. Even from a
hindsight perspective, foreseeability would be difficult to establish
under most realistic scenarios.
Thus, once again, in this roughly-defined category of cases, clus-
tered together largely because of their potential mass injury compo-
nent, tort as a default system seems unreliable at best if there is a
perceived need to afford compensation to victims of terrorist attacks.
Far more than the preceding September 11th scenario, however, doc-
trinal considerations predominate here (rather than secondary conse-
quences such as insolvency) and create major obstacles to tort
liability. In part, as just mentioned, this is because much of the re-
sponsibility for public safety is in the hands of public agencies, and
review of their performance is cloaked in considerations of judicial
deference.
But on closer inspection, it is also possible to tease out an additional
factor. In the context of September 11th, tort responsibility focused
upon particularized failures in product design (the security of the air-
plane flight deck, the structural adequacy of the buildings) or heed-
lessness in passenger inspection-familar-sounding allegations of
inadequate investment in safety mechanisms or careless oversight,
grounding liability in tort. By contrast, a failure to attend to public
safety at sites where large crowds typically are present or entire com-
munities are put at risk, constitutes an indictment of overall security
planning that may be an unhappy hallmark of an emerging era, but
remains at this juncture an unfamiliar and daunting task for judicial
administration through tort law.26
26. Of course, the claims of injury victims in these settings would always be framed in terms of
specific failures to exercise reasonable care, such as inadequate screening at gates of entry,
rather than in global allegations of inadequate security planning. But the limitation to reasona-
ble precautions in controlling large crowds, in tandem with foreseeability limitations, pose fairly
daunting obstacles to recovery underthis scenario.
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C. Localized Acts of Terror
For the present, one must look elsewhere, to foreign states under
siege, to identify realistic scenarios in this third category. For exam-
ple, car bombings in Northern Ireland and suicide missions on buses
and in cafes throughout Israel. Clearly, the conceptual lines are
blurred: Is a terrorist suicide bombing in a Jerusalem marketplace (or
caf6) an instance of mass terrorism or a localized event? Is it simply a
question of how many fatalities occur? Yet, it would be unfortunate,
in my view, to lump together all potential terrorist acts for purposes of
comprehensively thinking through the policy implications of the im-
pulse to assure a forum for compensation.
Consider, in this regard, that immediately after the February 2003
Rhode Island nightclub fire claimed the lives of 100 victims, the presi-
dent of the state bar association, among others, called for considera-
tion of a September 11th-type no-fault scheme for the surviving
families.27 By contrast, it is inconceivable that an isolated case of resi-
dential arson that extinguished the lives of a single innocent family
would have raised a similar expression of need for a compensation
plan. Similarly, for all the anxieties it provoked, the first World Trade
Center bombing failed to initiate a dialogue over government inter-
vention to provide assured compensation to the victims' survivors.
Sense of scale can, in short, lead to divergent pressures for a political
response. 28
As a background consideration, the question once again is how such
victims would fare under the tort system. To a certain extent, the
character of localized acts of terror offers the outline of an answer.
Localized acts-the seemingly random bombings in the midst of mun-
dane everyday activities-are aimed at making a statement in a some-
what different sense than an attack on a site with symbolic overtones,
such as the World Trade Center, Golden Gate Bridge, or Disneyland.
Through their very randomness, localized acts are aimed at creating
an atmosphere of anxiety and insecurity. No one knows when or
where the next shock wave will occur. And that, in turn, provides the
key to assessing the place of tort in default of assured compensation.
27. Marcella Bombardieri, Tragedy in Rhode Island; Insurance Unlikely To Cover All Claims,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2003, at Al.
28. At some point, the common denominator of terrorist-inspired incidents could eradicate
the line between attacks on the many and the few, between the public space and the corner
business enterprise. Such has been the case in Israel where, as will be discussed in the next
section, all terrorist attacks are compensable events. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying
text. But it is not an inevitable development.
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Perhaps the unhappy day will come when every proprietor of a side-
walk cafr or shopping center outlet, as well as the municipal operators
of bus systems, will be required as a matter of ordinary care to be on
heightened alert for sudden violence-with requisite costs of provid-
ing private, police-like security. But in the near future, at least, it
seems more likely that the closest tort analogue will be the obligations
presently imposed in the sub-category of premises liability cases deal-
ing with acts of criminal violence in residential buildings and on com-
mercial property.2 9
Essentially, the courts take three distinct positions in these cases,
none of which suggests that tort, as a general proposition, would offer
a promising pathway to compensation for victims of random localized
terrorist attacks.30 The narrowest position utilizes a "prior similar in-
cidents" test, which would require similar past terrorist acts at the site
as the touchstone to liability for failure to provide adequate security at
the time of an incident leading to serious personal harm. Obviously,
there is a poor fit between the nature of randomized violent acts of
terrorism and the requisites of this standard.
In contrast, a widely-adopted liability standard in premises violence
cases is the so-called "totality of the circumstances" test. Under this
approach, as the name suggests, an array of factors are taken into ac-
count in assessing responsibility, including, most critically, the amount
of criminal activity in the surrounding community. On occasion,
courts adopting this test have been willing to see a rash of prior minor,
property-related crimes as a sufficient precursor to a more violent in-
stance of armed assault or sexual attack. In the same way, the setting
of a high-crime area might serve as a linking circumstance to a terror-
ist incident at a neighborhood establishment. Nonetheless, the requi-
site of past criminal activity in the nearby surroundings surely is a
limiting factor, especially because terrorists are frequently drawn to
more upscale areas for a variety of reasons. And of course, the perpe-
tration of terrorist violence through stealth and subterfuge would fur-
ther bolster a defense that no reasonable measures to safeguard
against a foreseeable incident had been ignored.
Finally, many courts rely on a "balancing" test, which if it differs
from the totality of the circumstances approach in any meaningful
way, does so only through placing greater emphasis on the financial
29. For municipal activities, such as bus safety, or "localized" incidents occurring outside pri-
vate premises in public space (e.g., a street market), my earlier discussion of limited governmen-
tal liability carries over to this category of cases, as well.
30. On the three positions discussed in the text, see Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So.
2d 762 (La. 1999).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
burden of investing in particular security measures as a counterweight
to the likelihood of criminal activity. In a sense, this latter factor goes
to the heart of the matter. So long as terrorist incidents rely on stealth
and surprise-exploiting the unexpected-tort conceptions of respon-
sibility, which require no more than reasonable measures addressing
foreseeable risks, are likely to offer little to 'the victims of random
violence. From a compensation perspective, tort turns out to be
largely unavailing.31
III. INJURIES FROM TERRORIST ACTS: THE NO-FAULT OPTION
The previous section has sketched the reasons why tort liability is
uncertain at best and, realistically, probably unavailable in most situa-
tions as a source of compensation for the victims of terrorist 'acts.
Once the premise of assured compensation for victims of terrorism is
adopted-which will be questioned in the next section-the natural
turn is to a no-fault system. This shift in focus is foundational: tort is
grounded in the dual conception of a deserving plaintiff and a wrong-
doing defendant, irrespective of whether the philosophical underpin-
ning for liability is corrective justice or efficient allocation of
resources. 32 By contrast, no-fault is grounded in a social welfare per-
spective that defines deserving claimants exclusively in terms of harm
associated with a designated risk-generating activity. It is, however, a
major step from designating a category of "deserving claimants" to
deciding on the nature of benefits that should be available to eligible
sub-categories of recipients. The approach taken in defining benefits
is at the core of assessing the goals that a particular no-fault system is
designed to promote. It will be the central inquiry in this section.
In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, a no-fault compen-
sation plan was enacted that closely reflected the anxieties and emo-
tions stirred up by that fateful day. This nexus between a singular
event and an almost reflexive political reaction, as I will briefly de-
scribe, suggests both the qualifications with which one must view the
Fund as a blueprint for the future and the need to examine alternative
approaches to providing compensation to victims of terrorism.
31. From a deterrence perspective, which is not a central theme of this Article, tort is largely
irrelevant. This is most clearly the case in the aftermath of September l1th, which triggered a
host of heightened security measures entirely apart from any tort-related incentives. More gen-
erally, to the extent that terrorist threats are a salient public concern, regulatory and policing
initiatives are likely to largely supplant the deterrence role of tort.
32. Strictly speaking, it is not essential from an economi6 efficiency perspective that the victim
in fact be compensated; the focus is on optimal deterrence, and this goal can be achieved without
compensation going to the plaintiff, however "deserving" he or she may be.
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A. The September l1th Victim Compensation Fund:
Statutory Model
Within limits, the Fund was meant to create baseline assurance that
victims of physical injury and their survivors would receive benefits. 33
More precisely, the Fund established eligibility for individuals "pre-
sent at [any of the three crash sites] at the time, or in the immediate
aftermath, of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes, ' 34 and who "suf-
fered physical harm or death as a result of" the crashes.35 For this
circumscribed class, the Fund provides benefits for both economic and
noneconomic losses on a no-fault basis.36
In spelling out those benefits, however, the Fund appears to do a
dramatic about-face from its foregoing rejection of tort precepts. Eco-
nomic loss is defined to include not just medical expenses and loss of
present earnings, but "loss of business or employment opportuni-
ties"-presumably future lost income-"to the extent recovery for
such loss is allowed under applicable State law."' 37 And noneconomic
loss is broadly defined to include "losses for physical and emotional
pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish,
disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and compan-
ionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), he-
donic damages, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses
of any kind or nature. '38 Interestingly, no parallel to the economic
loss definition that referenced "[as] allowed under applicable State
law" is included in this latter definition of noneconomic loss. 39 None-
theless, the pervasive influence of the tort perspective of doing indi-
vidualized justice-disparaged by critics of the tort system, trumpeted
by its advocates-is apparent on the face of the provision.
Bit there is one substantial qualification to this apparent generosity
of spirit. Another bane of the existence of tort system critics is the
collateral source rule, which allows for the recovery in tort of out-of-
pocket expenses even if they have been reimbursed by "collateral"
sources such as health and disability insurance. Under the Fund, there
33. The description of the Fund and regulations that follow draws in part on an earlier treat-
ment; see Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Victims of September 11, 49
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 573 (2001).
34. Air Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 405(c)(2)(A)(i).
35. See id. § 405(c)(2)(A)(ii).
36. See id. § 402(5),(7).
37. See id. § 402(5).
38. See id. § 402(7).
39. See id. § 402(5).
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is no recovery for these items.40 Indeed, the restriction on "double
recovery," as tort critics would put it, is written in exceedingly broad
terms to cover "all collateral sources, including life insurance, pension
funds, death benefit programs, and payments by Federal, State, or lo-
cal governments related to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes .... ,,4
So, the Fund steers a somewhat uncertain course between collective
principles that would emphasize timely compensation and filling the
gaps of unmet need, on the one hand, and individualized recovery that
would pull in the direction of the tort model, on the other. Before
examining this tension in somewhat more detail, however, consider
the escape hatch provided in the Act: the prospect of lodging a tort
claim instead of proceeding under the Fund.
One can only speculate about why a statutory tort cause of action
for claimants was established in the Fund legislation; perhaps in recog-
nition of the fact that some victims with substantial collateral source
recoveries-most notably, victims with major life insurance holdings,
accrued pension benefits, or accidental death coverage-might well
have anticipated no recoverable benefits under the Fund.42 Or realis-
tically, Congress may have simply recognized that substantial catego-
ries of September 11th victims-most clearly, those suffering property
damage and psychological harm without accompanying physical in-
jury-were simply not covered by the Fund.43 Of course, tort, as the
default system, would have been available for addressing these
claims-how successfully is another matter-without the need for es-
tablishing a federal cause of action in the Act. But this would argua-
bly have created the appearance of treating Fund beneficiaries as
second-class citizens if they were offered no tort option.
Whatever the case, Congress's ambivalent embrace of tort is high-
lighted by the title of § 408, which created the federal cause of action:
"Limitation on Air Carrier Liability. ' 44 If Congress was determined
to leave tort as an option, it was equally determined to constrain tort
along lines familiar to observers of late twentieth century tort reform.
40. Nor is it possible to recover punitive damages under the Fund. See Air Transportation
Safety Act, supra note 1, § 405(b)(5).
41. See id. § 402(4). In treating life insurance and pension funds as "primary," the Fund de-
parts from the parameters of other no-fault schemes.
42. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the Special Master
softened the offset provision in the Final Rule. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
43. See the statute's provision identifying a claimant as an individual who has "suffered physi-
cal harm or death." Air Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 405(c)(2)(A)(ii). In addition,
the Special Master's decisions were made final, with no recourse to judicial review. See id.
§ 405(b)(3).
44. See id. § 408 (emphasis added).
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The Act established a ceiling on tort liability of the air carriers, pro-
viding that liability "shall not be in an amount greater than the limits
of the liability coverage maintained by the air carrier. ' 45 In subse-
quent legislation, this protective cap on liability, linking it to the limits
of insurance coverage, was carried over to aircraft manufacturers,
property owners in the World Trade Center, airport owners, and gov-
ernmental entities. 46
Ceilings aside, exclusive jurisdiction to hear "all actions brought for
any claim (including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or
death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes" was located in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York.47 But no federal common law was created;
rather, the court is to apply the substantive law of the state in which
the crash occurred.48 Finally, just to leave no doubt about it,
§ 408(b)(1) declares that the federal cause of action is to be "the ex-
clusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and subse-
quent crashes of such flights. '49
Thus, claimants eligible under the Fund are put to a choice-they
must elect either to claim benefits under the Fund or to waive their
rights and pursue a tort claim. 50 At the same time, for those falling
outside the eligibility limits of the Fund, tort, as circumscribed in the
Act, remains available.
This, then, is the basic structure of the Fund and the tort option.
One is left with a fundamental question: Is the Fund, on the one hand,
grounded in a collective model emphasizing needs-based benefits for a
community of victims? Or, is it grounded in an individual entitle-
ments model of compensating for harm on a case-by-case basis (a
45. See id. § 408(a). The amount of insurance coverage was reported to be $1.5 billion per
plane. See Jim VandeHei & Milo Geyelin, Economic Impact. Bush Seeks To Limit Liability of
Companies Sued as Result of Attacks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2001, at A6.
46. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201(b)(2), 115 Stat.
645 (2001). It is noteworthy, however, that the same Act refused to limit the liability of compa-
nies supplying airport security: "Nothing in this section shall in any way limit any liability of any
person who is engaged in the. business of providing air transportation security and who is not an
airline or airport sponsor or director, officer, or employee of an airline or airport sponsor." See
id. § 201(b)(2)(a)(3). This provision was in turn subsequently modified to limit the liability of
some airport screening companies. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
§ 890, 116 Stat. 2135, 2251 (2002).
47. Air Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 408(b)(3).
48. See id. § 408(b)(2).
49. See id. § 408(b)(1).
50. See id. § 405(c)(3)(B). In the Final Rule, the Special Master included a provision offering
claimants an opportunity to request a rough calculation of benefits under the Fund before decid-
ing between options. Warily Circling the September lth Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A26.
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somewhat paler version of tort)? As the previous discussion indicates,
there is evidence pointing in both directions. 51
In support of a needs-based model, there is initially the choice of
no-fault, in and of itself. Although no-fault schemes are not narrowly
needs-based, they are premised on the notion that compensation for
basic economic harm suffered is the first order of business, and that
considerations of defendant misconduct and plaintiff contributory
carelessness (fault and comparative fault) are largely irrelevant-that
injury arising out of a given activity or event is, in itself, a sufficient
condition to warrant redress. 52 This does seem to square with the un-
derlying premise of the Fund, disavowing "fault" as a prerequisite for
recovery. In addition, the treatment of collateral sources-the strik-
ing set-off provision for "all collateral source compensation, including
life insurance, pension funds [and other government benefit
schemes]"-further supports this horizontal equity/needs-based read-
ing of the Fund objectives. 53 Finally, there is the retention of the tort
option. If a true option in the strong sense, tort might well have been
regarded as an individual rights pathway for those choosing to forgo
the contrasting collectively-based welfare scheme.
51. It should be noted that there is virtually no legislative history to serve as guidance on the
provisions of the Fund.
52. On the irrelevance of fault considerations, and the activity-based nexus for claims, see
generally ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING
THE SOCIAL COMPACT 13 (1991). The high priority given to basic economic harm is illustrated in
the auto no-fault context by the New York no-fault statute, among the most generous, which
explicitly allows recovery only for "basic economic need" (up to $50,000). See N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 5102(a), art. 51 (McKinney 1995). In the workers' compensation context, the focus on basic
economic loss is demonstrated by the caps on recovery for lost wages at modest levels in death
and serious injury cases, as well as the exclusion of noneconomic loss from compensable harm.
See infra note 66; 5 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 93.01 (2000).
Under the black lung statute, miners who are totally disabled are entitled to very modest bene-
fits of 37.5% of the monthly pay rate for low-level federal employees in grade GS-2, step 1. 30
U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (2000).
Indeed, the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Act of 2003, enacted in the aftermath of Septem-
ber llth as part of the continuing response to the threat of terrorism, in striking contrast to the
Fund, provides standard no-fault type benefits: 66% of wages to eligible individuals permanently
disabled by complications from the vaccine, 75% if the victim has a spouse or dependents, with a
ceiling of $50,000 per year; in cases of death, a lump sum of $262,000 or at the election of the
beneficiary, annual payments of 75% of the decedent's salary until the youngest child turns 18.
See CQ Today Legal Affairs, April 11, 2003, at http://www.cq.com/aggregatedocs.do (last visited
Jan. 5, 2004).
53. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, § 104.47, 66 Fed.
Reg. 66,274, 66,287 (Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)) (emphasis added). In-
deed, the italicized terms underscore the possibility of reading the provision to offset private
charitable contributions, as well. This possibility raised a sufficient outcry to trigger an early
assurance from the Special Master that such private contributions would not be taken into ac-
count in determining awards. See Putting a Price on a Life, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2002, § 2, at 8.
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On the other hand, the Fund provisions offer clear support for an
individual entitlements model reading. To begin with, the scheme de-
fines "economic loss" to include future lost earnings as interpreted in
applicable state law. This interpretive approach presumably antici-
pates case-by-case projections of the future earning power of the par-
ticular claimant. In the same vein, the definition of "noneconomic
loss" to include unlimited pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and
"all other [intangible loss] of any kind" is a straightforward invitation
to assess harm case-by-case. Indeed, the notion of subjectively re-
dressing noneconomic loss is inherently at odds with the collective,
insurance-based principles underlying no-fault. 54 And finally, the
overall cap on liability in tort at insurance limits, combined with the
likely prospect that non-Fund based tort claims (especially for prop-
erty damage) might seriously limit recovery for personal harm in tort,
could be taken as indirect evidence that a measure of complementary
individualization was anticipated in the no-fault scheme.55 In other
words, if claimants were to be coerced into no-fault by circumstances
beyond their control, they should get some approximation of what tort
would ordinarily have to offer.
The threshold argument for relying on this conflicted model in the
future-that future victims of terrorism ought not to be treated differ-
ently from September 11th victims-falls out immediately because, as
we will see, the Special Master's implementation of the Fund provi-
sions is grounded in interpretive regulations that radically depart from
a literal reading of the statute.5 6
On the merits, in my view, there would be no satisfying rationale for
establishing an ongoing no-fault plan for compensating victims of ter-
rorism that mimicked the tort system by providing unconstrained and
individualized recovery for economic and noneconomic loss. In every
case, across the entire spectrum of no-fault programs, from work-re-
lated to crime-related compensation and from injuries associated with
military service to the unfortunate victims of vaccine-related mishaps,
there is not a single program that grants recovery for wage loss reflect-
ing the tort system's total disregard for considerations of horizontal
54. Although, however, no-fault schemes that replace tort in its entirety sometimes retain
scheduled pain and suffering. See Stephen Todd, Privatization of Accident Compensation: Policy
and Politics in New Zealand, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 404 (2000) (examining New Zealand's experi-
ence with a comprehensive no-fault accident compensation scheme).
55. See Geraldine Baum & Josh Meyer, Final Rules on September lth Fund Give Families
More Money, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 8, 2002, at Al.
56. This alternative model, as I have called it, triggered unsuccessful litigation by claimants
arguing that the Special Master's implementing regulations were inconsistent with the statutory
framework. See Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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equity and need-based considerations. Nor is there a single instance
in which no-fault programs provide for unconstrained case-by-case de-
terminations of noneconomic loss.
At the same time, the collateral offset recognized by the Fund is
similarly beyond the pale of the traditional offsets for redundant ben-
efit payments in other no-fault systems. In fact, read literally, the
Fund offset provision could plausibly have been extended to offsetting
private charitable contributions: the Fund provides that "all" collat-
eral sources "including" life insurance, pensions, and public welfare
schemes are to be deducted from benefits received.57 Moreover,
under any reading of the Fund provisions, as the immediately preced-
ing language makes clear, benefits are to be reduced in the sum of
realizable life insurance and pension proceeds-once again, a design
feature unprecedented in view of other no-fault programs. Here, too,
one can ask why considerations of fairness and equity would warrant
treating victims of terrorism differently from other categories of no-
fault recipients by looking beyond medical and wage replacement sys-
tems to private arrangements triggered by premature death.
These singular aspects of the Fund were not lost on the Special
Master, looking not to future possible victims of terrorism but facing
the immediate task of developing a concrete program for determining
benefit awards for victims of September 11th. I turn next to his ef-
forts, which, I have suggested, offer an alternative vision of how one
might design a no-fault model for future victims of terrorism.
B. The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Regulatory
Guidelines Model
When the Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, was appointed on No-
vember 26, 2001, his initial task was to promulgate regulations resolv-
ing the principal tensions in the Act and filling in some important
blanks.58 He tested the waters, so to speak, by issuing a set of draft
regulations (Interim Final Rule) for commentary on December 21,
2001. 59 Subsequently, on March 8, 2002, he issued final regulations
(Final Rule), spelling out his interpretations of Fund provisions.60
57. The Special Master rejected this reading in his Interim Final Rule. September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at
28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)).
58. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Special Master; Me-
diator Named to Run September l1th Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at B1.
59. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. at
66,274.
60. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar.
13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)).
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Feinberg's reading of the main provisions of the Fund reveals an
interesting effort to strike a balance between understanding the Act in
traditional no-fault terms that would have emphasized meeting sched-
uled basic loss of victims, and interpreting the Act in an open-ended
fashion that essentially would have offered tort-type, individualized
compensation in a no-fault setting. His manner of resolving this ten-
sion is evident in the approach taken to the three key substantive ben-
efit provisions that I have already discussed: collateral source offset,
economic loss, and noneconomic loss.
1. Collateral Source Offset
As mentioned earlier, the Act explicitly called for the offset of life
insurance and pension benefits. These provisions raised a firestorm of
criticism from victims' families (in particular, the well-endowed), con-
cerned that they were likely to receive nothing in Fund benefits be-
cause of the foresight of the deceased, who it was argued, had earned
or set aside funds for just such a contingency as occurred.61 These
protests were sharpened to a fine point by prospective claimants ob-
serving that unconstrained tort-the absence of a fund-would be a
superior option, because life insurance and pension benefits tradition-
ally are not offset under the tort system.62
The Special Master responded to these criticisms in the Final Rule
by interpreting the Act to allow reduction of the offset to the extent of
victims' self-contributions. 63 More generally, Feinberg announced
that it would be "very rare" for any eligible claimant to receive less
than $250,000.64 It should be noted that neither of these interpretive
moves is grounded in the language of the Act.
Rather, the Special Master's actions reflected a fundamental philo-
sophical difference buried in the esoteric legal language of collateral
offset. On the one hand, a need-based approach to compensation
would point to full offset of all collateral sources, as the Act appeared
to require, because these outside benefits do contribute to meeting
basic needs. On the other hand, under an individual claimant-focused,
tort-type inquiry as to the "deserving" status of the victim, offsets ar-
guably would be ignored entirely. In the end, the Special Master ar-
rived at something of a compromise, liberalizing the statute from the
victims' perspective by reducing the offset through recognition of vic-
61. See Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Federal Fund; Official Vows All Fami-
lies of Victims Will Get Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B7.
62. This assumes, of course, that liability would have been possible to establish in tort.
63. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233.
64. See id. at 11,234 (statement by the Special Master).
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tims' contributions and entirely ignoring outside private charity re-
ceived by Fund-eligible claimants, while establishing a quite
substantial presumptive minimum recovery.
2. Economic Loss
As I have indicated, in addressing economic loss, the Act appears to
be at cross-purposes with the literal terms of the collateral source off-
set provision, in referring to recovery of "loss of business or employ-
ment opportunities" as defined in state tort law. 65 On its face, this
would seem to suggest an individualized inquiry in every case into the
lifetime earnings prospects of each deceased victim, which is entirely
at odds with the traditional approach of scheduled benefits. 66
In the Final Rule, the Special Master again crafted a compromise.
Although there is no mention of scheduling in the statute, Feinberg
established a grid applicable to the range of potential claimants-a
"presumed economic loss" schedule-based on age, size of family,
and recent past earnings, along with a presumptive cap applicable to
the upper two percent of income earners. 67 In devising this strategy,
he provided for awards that recognized very considerable future earn-
ings disparities, an announced range of $250,000 to between $3 and $4
million.68 But at the same time, he rejected an approach that would
65. Air Transportation Safety Act, supra note 1, § 402(5).
66. Death benefits are typically calculated as a fixed percentage of the decedent's average
weekly wage, which is capped at a level that varies from state to state, but generally approxi-
mates the average weekly wage in the state. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, State Workers' Compensa-
tion Laws 2001, available at http//www.dol.gov/esalregs/statutes/owcp/stwclaw/tables - pdf/table-
12.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003); see also AFL-CIO, Workers' Compensation Comparisons 2001,
available at http://www.aflcio.org/yourjobeconomy/safety/wc/upload/comptable.pdf (last visited
Sept. 4, 2003). See generally 5 LARSON, supra note 52, § 93.01 ("The beginning point in calculat-
ing the amount of benefits is the 'average weekly wage.' This, when the fixed statutory percent-
age of roughly between one-half and two-thirds has been applied to it, becomes the unit of
benefit by which practically all compensation ... is measured, subject to maximum and minimum
limits."). In many states, including New York, the surviving spouse continues to receive the
weekly benefit during the entire period of widow/widowerhood, which continues until the surviv-
ing spouse remarries or dies. Some states, however, impose limits on the duration (e.g., 500
weeks in Michigan) or the total dollar amount (e.g., $160,000 in California) of the death benefits.
5 id. § 98.03[1]; 10 id. app. B-16; N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 16 (McKinney 2002); CAL. LAB.
CODE § 4702 (West 2002). For the New York schedule of benefits for serious injuries (perma-
nent partial disability), see N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2002).
67. September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,237. In
the case claiming that Feinberg had ventured beyond the framework created by the statute, the
Special Master's presumptive cap was the subject of special attack, but to no avail. See Colaio v.
Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 273, 289-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
68. The final rule indicates that awards less than $250,000 "will be very rare" and "awards in
excess of $3 or $4 million will be rare." September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,
Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,234 (statement by the Special Master).
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have recognized entirely open-ended, case-by-case speculation about
future earnings prospects. 69
3. Noneconomic Loss
Although there are exceptions, no-fault schemes typically do not
provide for pain and suffering loss, apart from optional or supplemen-
tal recourse to tort.70 In fact, tort law itself, as encapsulated in wrong-
ful death statutes, did not traditionally provide any pain and suffering
loss for survivors-that is, loss of companionship. 71 Indeed, many
states still do not recognize nonpecuniary loss as compensable to sur-
vivors in tort, limiting recovery to economic loss. 72 And some other
states, such as California, refuse to recognize pain and suffering of the
deceased victim prior to death as recoverable in tort.73
Nonetheless, the Special Master provided for scheduled
noneconomic benefit awards under the Fund for each victim and
every surviving eligible family member. In the Interim Final Rule,
$250,000 was to be awarded for each victim; 74 a figure that remained
unchanged in the Final Rule.75 With respect to survivors, the Interim
Final Rule provided $50,000 for the spouse and each dependent, a fig-
ure that was increased to $100,000 each in the Final Rule.76 Thus, a
surviving spouse with two children would receive benefits of $550,000
for noneconomic loss in a claim under the Fund.
4. Resolving Tensions: A Hybrid Model
The game plan for implementation that emerges from the Fund and
its subsequent interpretation in the Final Rule can be seen as a hybrid
model: one foot in no-fault precepts and the other in tort principles.
Neither the Fund provisions nor the implementing regulations can be
read, however, apart from the long shadow cast by three related con-
siderations: 1) the constraints on the tort action provided as an op-
69. See Putting a Value on Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A26.
70. See, e.g., 1 LARSON, supra note 52, § 1.03[4] ("There is no place in [workers'] compensa-
tion law for damages on account of pain or suffering, however dreadful they may be.").
71. See, e.g., Liff v. Schildkrout, 404 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y. 1980).
72. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 297 (2001).
73. See Williamson v. Plant Insulation Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (Ct. App. 1994); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 2003).
74. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,274, 66,279 (Dec. 21, 2001).
75. September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233,
11,239 (Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)).
76. See id. at 11.246; September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule,
66 Fed. Reg. at 66,279.
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tional remedy, 2) the fundamental structure of common law tort rules,
and 3) the September l1th events themselves.
Consider, initially, the constraints on the tort remedy enacted along
with the Fund. As mentioned earlier, this statutory tort action, replac-
ing common law tort rights (albeit adopting common law substantive
tort principles), capped tort at insurance limits against virtually all po-
tential defendants. 77 As a practical matter, this was taken to mean
that recovery under the tort option, if it were exercised, might be se-
verely limited after all the outside property damage claims (which of
necessity would be brought in tort) were aggregated with personal in-
jury claims: $1.5 billion per air carrier, it was thought, would soon be
exceeded.78 To the extent that this perception was accurate, it created
pressure for a no-fault option sufficiently robust to avoid coercing
claimants into substantially diminished recoveries in tort.
Related to this point, tort was by no means clearly an available op-
tion. As discussed earlier, the applicable common law rules required a
considerable stretch to provide a remedy to victims in the buildings;
and, as far as passengers on the flights were concerned, negligence of
the carriers and baggage inspectors-let alone more attenuated de-
fendants-was not a foregone conclusion.
Finally, the event itself cast a long shadow. As I have suggested, no
one would rest easily with coercing the surviving families into a long,
drawn-out pursuit of recovery in tort, given the special sympathy for
their plight.
In view of these factors, the Special Master's strategy emerges and
becomes apparent: edge up closely enough to the range of tort com-
pensation to make no-fault benefits under the Fund an offer that
could not be refused by most eligible parties. 79 Note that this is a very
different set of motivations than one ordinarily finds underlying no-
fault systems. Workers' compensation, auto no-fault, black lung bene-
fits for coal miners, and virtually every other system of no-fault,
unapologetically provide a form of social insurance against risk; they
77. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. Subsequent legislation also capped the liability
of the airport screeners, for the most part. See supra note 46.
78. See Lizette Alvarez & Stephen Labaton, A Nation Challenged: The Bailout; An Airline
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at Al; Mary Jacoby, Lawyers Say Suits May Benefit Clients,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 1A; Bob Van Voris, Lawyers Take Over Ground Zero
Litigation To Follow Compensation Regs, 24 NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11th, 2002, at Al: David W. Chen,
Suits by 950 Families Allege Safety Lapses at the Towers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at B3.
79. Feinberg's strategy appears to have been a success. At the filing deadline, December 22,
2003, 97% of eligible relatives had filed claims under the Fund. See David W. Chen, Man Be-
hind Sept. 11 Fund Describes Effort as a Success, with Reservations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at
CIO.
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are not fraught with the symbolic significance associated with heroism
and patriotic feelings.
Perhaps, however, victims of terrorism are in fact different. Staying
with this supposition for the moment, the Special Master's hybrid
model nonetheless retains distinct elements of tort-type recovery that
are difficult to reconcile with a social welfare perspective. On this
score, it will be useful to consider briefly some contrasting foreign
models.
C. Contrasting Foreign Models: A Brief Note
Israel, of course, has been plagued by terrorism in recent years;
most notably the first intafada, during the early 1980s, and the recent
wave of sustained violence, the second intafada, beginning in fall 2000.
Interestingly, Israel acted much earlier, in 1970, to establish a special
benefits scheme for the victims of enemy action, the Compensation
for Those Injured by Hostilities Act.80 The Act provides benefits to
all victims of terrorist activities and their families.8 To receive com-
pensation, the beneficiary obtains certification from the Defense Min-
istry that the injury or death was due to an "enemy-inflicted injury. ' 82
Once certification is received, an eligible beneficiary who has suffered
a disabling injury is entitled to medical expenses and an allowance for
other economic loss (but not noneconomic loss). If the victim is less
than twenty percent disabled, there is a lump sum payment; if twenty
percent or greater, a monthly allowance that includes wage loss linked
to another statute, the Handicapped People (Allowances and Rehabil-
itation) Act, which refers to the "controlling salary" (i.e., a cap) as an
Israeli-average payment criterion.83 In addition, eligible recipients are
provided a package of supplementary benefits, such as vocational re-
habilitation and assistance in purchasing an apartment. But there is
no provision for pain and suffering-type loss. 84
80. Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 24 L.S.I. 131 (1969-1970).
81. Moreover, it includes coverage of foreign tourists, as well, and Israelis working outside the
country.
82. Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 24 L.S.I. 131, 134. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the Israeli benefit scheme, see Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for Harm Caused
by Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. REv. 335 (2003).
83. See Sommer, supra note 82, at 344-46. I am indebted to Professor Alex Stein, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Faculty of Law, for additional information presented here.
84. More generally, the Israeli tort system recognizes a far more modest conception of pain
and suffering than is reflected in American tort damage awards.
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In the case of death from a terrorist act, survival benefits are identi-
cal to those of the families of soldiers killed in the line of duty.8 5 Sur-
vivors are entitled to monthly benefit payments expressed as a
percentage of the average salary of a low-level government employee,
as well as an array of supplementary economic benefits for education,
psychological assistance, and living expenses. 86 Again, however, there
is no payment category reflecting intangible harm, such such as loss of
companionship. 87
The Israeli approach clearly reflects a conception of victimization
that would have rung hollow in this country before September 11th.
The most telling feature is the linkage of reparation for death to
soldiers killed in action, reflecting the conviction that domestic terror-
ism in Israel is just one of the tragic consequences of a continuing
state of war. Whatever the political salience in this country of "war on
terrorism" imagery evoked after September 11th, it remains an open
question whether every victim of terrorism in this country will be
viewed as tantamount to a fallen soldier. However this question is
answered, it is interesting to note the sharp contrast between the
strong individualistic norm that remains even in the hybrid September
11th model devised by the Special Master-a schedule of "presumed
loss" that, even presumptively capped at the high end, tracks the wide
disparities in earnings in the U.S. economy-and the communal norm
underlying the Israeli adherence to horizontal equity in compensating
for economic loss.88
Northern Ireland offers another example of a country that has long
endured the consequences of a protracted reign of terrorist acts.
There, too, the unfortunate victims can turn to a no-fault scheme that
provides benefits in cases of personal harm, the Northern Ireland
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2002 (superseding an earlier
act).8 9 But, the approach is strikingly different from either the Fund
or the Israeli system. Under the Compensation Scheme, not only vic-
tims of terrorism, but those suffering injury or death from violent
85. The referenced statute is The Allowance (Families of Soldiers Fallen in Combat) Act, 4
L.S.I. 115 (1950). See also Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at
92.
86. Sommer, supra note 82, at 348-51.
87. Id.
88. In sharp contrast to death benefit awards under the Fund, survivors of members of the
United States military killed while on active duty are entitled to receive a "death gratuity" of
$6,000. 10 U.S.C. § 1478(a) (2000). Military personnel can also choose to purchase up to
$250,000 in armed service-provided group life insurance.
89. The Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland) Order 2002, STAT. R. & O.N. IR.
No. 796 (2002), available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/cipo.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
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crimes other than terrorism, can recover. 90 Indeed, coverage is ex-
ceedingly wide, ranging from sexual abuse (by nonfamily members) to
specified intentional acts, such as poisoning, arson, and deliberately-
instigated attacks by animals. Obviously, this wide array of covered
acts suggests a quite different rationale for granting no-fault recovery,
most succinctly stated in the published guide to compensation under
the scheme as "an expression of public sympathy and support for in-
nocent victims." 91 Thus, if Israel regards victims of terrorism figura-
tively as fallen soldiers in a war with a foreign enemy, Northern
Ireland, by contrast, treats terrorism as one particular manifestation of
intentional wrongdoing-a phenomenon that in its very randomness
warrants a public expression of support for the unfortunate, innocent
victims.
Recovery under the Northern Ireland scheme is referenced to a
very detailed workers' compensation-type tariff of scheduled benefits,
providing specified flat sum recovery for loss associated with desig-
nated body parts or sustained mental disability.92 These benefits, in
the nature of a fixed award for pain and suffering, may be supple-
mented by long-term wage loss as well.93 In cases of accidental death,
benefit payments to survivors under the tariff are rather modest,
£12,000; but the schedule of benefits for injuries runs up to £255,000 in
cases of quadriplegia. 94 In addition, the Northern Ireland scheme
takes a strikingly liberal stance on coverage in allowing recovery of
modest sums to close relatives of victims of criminal violence for their
mental distress. 95
The Northern Ireland scheme, with its broader conception of vic-
timization, serves as a good point of reference for turning to a poten-
tially more inclusive domestic model of compensation for terrorist
90. Compensation for property damage resulting from terrorist activities is available under
the Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11th (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/
20000011.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
91. COMp. AGENCY, FOR N. IR., A GUIDE TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND CRIMINAL INJURIES
COMPENSATION SCHEME 2002 16, available at http://www.compensationni.gov.uk/pdf/com-
plete-guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2003).
92. Id. at 30-47.
93. The claimant receives no benefits for the first twenty-eight weeks of wage loss. See North-
ern Ireland Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 30 (2002), available at http://
www.compensationni.gov.uk/pdf/nicics02.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2003). Moreover, recovery is
capped: "Any rate of net loss of earnings or earning capacity . . .which is to be taken into
account in calculating any compensations payable .. .must not exceed one and half times the
gross average industrial earnings in Northern Ireland at the time of assessment . Id. 34.
94. Id. 34.
95. Id. T 10.
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victims that has been adopted throughout the United States, the state
crime victim compensation acts.
D. State Crime Victim Compensation Programs
California created the first state crime victim compensation pro-
gram in 1965, and other states quickly followed suit. 96 Five more
states created programs in the next three years, and twenty-eight
states had adopted programs by 1980.9 7 The federal government be-
gan supporting efforts in this area in 1974, providing $50 million to
victim service programs through the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) of the Department of Justice.98 The LEAA
was terminated in the early 1980s, but the 1982 Report of the Presi-
dent's Task Force on Victims of Crime found that federal funding
would encourage the development of state victim assistance pro-
grams.99 Subsequently, Congress passed the Victims of Crime Act
(VOCA) in 1984, providing matching funds to states with victim com-
pensation programs. 100
Following the enactment of VOCA, which currently matches sixty
percent of state expenditures on crime victim compensation programs
(with a five percent cap on the amount of federal funds that can be
used for administrative expenses), every state has now adopted a
crime victim compensation scheme.10 1 The details of these programs
vary from state to state, but, to qualify for federal funding, state pro-
grams have to comply with certain requirements. Victims of violent
crimes suffering injury and homicide victims' survivors must be eligi-
ble to receive compensation.10 2 Funds may be used to pay for a wide
range of crime-related expenses including medical and dental, mental
health, funeral and burial, lost wages or lost support, and even crime
scene clean-up costs. 10 3
96. NAT'L ASS'N. OF CRIME VICTIM COMP. BDS. (NACVCB), CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION;
AN OVERVIEW, available at http://www.nacvcb.org/articles/Overviewprn.html (last visited Sept.
5, 2003) [hereinafter NACVCB OVERVIEW].
97. Id.
98. See generally LISA NEWMARK ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF
STATE VIcTIMS OF CRIME ACT COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE ADMINISTRATORS (2001), available
at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/410142 rs_091401.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
99. Id.
100. Victims of Crime Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (1984).
101. NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 98.
102. Id.
103. Programs must compensate victims of federal crimes and must also cover state residents
who are victims of terrorism while traveling outside the United States. NEWMARK ET AL., supra
note 98, at 4.
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State crime victim compensation programs collectively spent more
than $350 million and approved more than 140,000 claims for compen-
sation in 2001. Medical and dental costs accounted for forty-five per-
cent of these expenditures, lost wages and loss of support payments
accounted for another twenty percent of the funds, and mental health
costs were the third largest category of expenditures at fifteen percent.
Compensation for assault-related harms claimed more than three
times as much of total expenditures (fifty-two percent) as the second-
largest category, homicides (sixteen percent). 10 4
Apart from the federal grants, funding for the state programs comes
from two principal sources. In more than eighty percent of states,
fines and fees paid by criminal offenders provide the bulk of the fund-
ing for the criminal compensation programs.105 Similarly, federal
funding under VOCA comes from fines, penalty assessments, and for-
feitures in federal criminal cases.10 6 Thus, in contrast to the no-fault
models discussed earlier, most of the crime victim compensation pro-
grams do not draw on general revenues, and in a limited sense, seek to
internalize the costs of violent crime.
State compensation programs limit the amount of compensation
that victims can receive in at least three ways. Caps on maximum
awards range from a low of $7,500 in Maine to a high of $50,000 in
Nevada, with an average state maximum of roughly $25,000.107 A
handful of states limit the amount that can be recovered by category
of compensation rather than imposing an overall cap. In 2001, the
nationwide average award was roughly $2,500.108 Payments are also
reduced by collateral offset rules in every state.10 9 Victim compensa-
tion programs will only pay expenses that are not covered by medical
or auto insurance, Social Security, or other collateral sources.' 10 Con-
viction or apprehension of the person responsible for committing the
crime, however, is not a prerequisite for a victim to receive
compensation.'
104. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NATION WIDE ANALYSIS VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT, 2001 VICTIMS
OF CRIME ACT OF 1984 PERFORMANCE REPORT STATE COMPENSATION PROGRAM, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/fund/vocanpr-vc01.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2003) (updated peri-
odically) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANALYSIS].
105. NACVCB OVERVIEW, supra note 96. In the remaining states, general revenue appropri-
ations by the legislature provide the primary source of funding.
106. NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 98, at 1.
107. Id. at 6.
108. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANALYSIS, supra note 104.





Finally, the programs reveal a prominent moralistic strand. State
schemes do not typically provide compensation to persons injured
while committing crimes or whose own misconduct contributed to
their injuries. At least five states go so far as to authorize denial of
compensation to victims who have previously engaged in criminal con-
duct completely unrelated to the incident for which they are currently
seeking compensation. 112
This brief sketch-in particular, the low ceilings on maximum re-
covery-makes clear the modest scope of these programs. The
schemes are designed primarily to address the immediate basic needs
of crime victims associated with the violence itself. In this regard,
they offer something of a safety net to crime victims, rather than aspir-
ing to restore benefit recipients to a semblance of their previous sta-
tion in life-as all of the no-fault plans described earlier do, in varying
degree.
E. An Afterword
In this array of no-fault models, the Fund appears notably generous
from a need-based, let alone a restorative, perspective, even under the
constrained interpretation of the Special Master. Once again, it is crit-
ical to focus on the basic, contrasting premises of tort law. In particu-
lar, I have in mind the point of intersection of deterrence and
corrective justice theories: that a "responsible" defendant ought to be
charged with losses reflecting what is required to make a "deserving"
plaintiff whole.113 These considerations are foreign to the no-fault
model, which is premised on a collective notion that basic needs re-
covery ought to be the norm for categories of beneficiaries afforded
special recognition from a social welfare perspective-not necessarily
an absolute limitation to basic needs, but in every case a recognition
of some horizontal equity constraints. I remain unconvinced that any
future special recognition of victims of terrorism outside tort would,
or should, depart from this latter norm.
In an important sense, though, the Fund's comparative merits raise
second-order considerations. I have saved for last the more funda-
mental question in assessing its longer-term viability: whether any
compensation scheme designed specially to benefit victims of terror-
ism, or more broadly violent crime, rests on a satisfying justificatory
principle.
112. Id.
113. This assumes no shared responsibility-an assumption that holds for present purposes
(victims of terrorism and criminal violence).
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IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON RECOGNIZING DISCRETE CATEGORIES
OF VICTIMS FOR COMPENSATION
Almost a century ago, in a classic article, Sequel to Workmen's
Compensation,'14 Jeremiah Smith reacted with dismay to the initial
wave of no-fault reform:
If the fundamental general principle of the modern common law of
torts (that fault is requisite to liability) is intrinsically right or expe-
dient, is there sufficient reason why the legislature should make the
workmen's case an exception to this general principle? On the
other hand, if this statutory rule as to workmen is intrinsically just
or expedient, is there sufficient reason for ... refusing to make this
statutory rule the test of the right of recovery on the part of persons
other than workmen when they suffer hurt without the fault of ei-
ther party?1 15
This is not the place to reconsider the case for now long-established
categories of no-fault claimants. But every proposal to adopt or ex-
pand a new category of beneficiaries raises the basic issue of justifica-
tion in principle that troubled Smith in earlier times.
The Fund, and various alternative models for superseding the de-
fault system of tort, make claims for special treatment on behalf of
victims of terrorist incidents. But what precisely is the premise on
which these claims rest? The Fund itself can be narrowly construed as
a special case: terrorism as manifested in a singularly horrific sequence
of events was tantamount to an act of war. So characterized, however,
it is of limited interest as a precedent for future consideration; it was
simply the occasion for an ad hoc political response. On further re-
flection, however, a similar conception of victims as martyrs of attacks
on the nation can be associated with the Israeli no-fault scheme for
compensating victims of terrorism-and the Israeli scheme is, of
course, ongoing in coverage rather than tied to the casualties of a sin-
gle incident.
Whatever one makes of the rhetoric of a "war on terrorism" in the
context of our current national state of affairs, linking a compensation
scheme to alien enemy attacks establishes an uneasy limiting princi-
ple. Is there good reason to opt for a no-fault scheme that would dis-
tinguish between events with the strong commonalities of September
11th and Oklahoma City, on the grounds that Timothy McVeigh was
an American citizen rather than a foreign operative? At the same
time, the "war" rhetoric is placed under considerable strain if victims
114. Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workermen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235
(1913).
115. Id. at 251.
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of McVeigh are afforded similar treatment to September 11th victims.
The logical consequence would be that the nation has been "at war"
with various benighted predecessors to McVeigh, from assorted mot-
ley white Aryan survivalists to Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber-all of
whom have claimed multiple innocent victims out of a sense of rage
against the social order, as they viewed it.
In fact, the more closely one focuses on terrorism as the linchpin for
a no-fault plan, the more unstable the foundation becomes. Cut loose
from the war rhetoric, there remains a necessity to ground the estab-
lishment of a scheme in some special sense of indebtedness to the un-
fortunate victims of terrorist activity; some basis for expressing a
special sense of national gratitude or bereavement. 116 Of course,
there is nothing illegitimate about these sentiments. But they seem to
miss the mark in the context of the Unabomber's victims, or those
who fell before the brief reign of terror of the Washington-area snip-
ers, John Muhammad and Lee Malvo, in October 2002. To discrimi-
nate among this multitude of victims, all of whom were, in the
common vernacular, victims of terrorism, seems at odds with a basic
sense of fairness-that is, treating like cases in like fashion. Yet none
of the justifications offered above seems to satisfy a claim for uniform
treatment of these disparate incidents of terrorism.
Under a broader conception focusing on victims of criminal vio-
lence, as in Northern Ireland or the state victim compensation pro-
grams, there would be no call for these refined distinctions among
terrorist activities in creating a beneficiary class. Still, the search for a
satisfying justificatory principle remains problematic. The highly
respected English scholar, Patrick Atiyah, has been one of the most
outspoken critics of the English Crime Injuries Compensation
Scheme, adopted in 1964, which played a formative role in triggering
California's pioneering adoption of a similar program one year later in
this country.1 17 Atiyah levels a general attack on the Scheme reminis-
cent of Jeremiah Smith almost a century ago:
116. Another argument would be the failure of the state to meet an implicit obligation to
provide public security. But there is a striking disjuncture between this rationale and the judicial
resistance in tort to recognizing a general obligation on the part of the police to prevent criminal
acts that result in personal injury. See, e.g., Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y.
1987). More generally, the rationale of failure to provide adequate security offers no satisfactory
stopping point from a no-fault perspective short of a blanket assurance that anyone injured by a
random act of violence in a public place will receive state compensation. Interestingly, however,
this argument may have special force in the context of September 11th, in view of the documen-
tation of security lapses prior to the events of that day. See supra note 24.
117. See 1965 Cal. Stat. 1549.
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The [Home Office working party] committee never really came to
grips with the crucial issue, which is not whether victims of criminal
violence ought to be compensated by the State, but whether there
are any grounds for giving such victims financial support over and
above social security benefits available to others. The committee
did point out that the welfare state did nothing for the victims of
crimes of violence 'as such.' But why should this matter, provided it
does something for them? The working party perhaps thought that
social security benefits were too low. If this is so, the right solution
is to increase benefits across the board, not to provide extra benefits
for particular groups of needy people at the expense of the
generality.' 18
To highlight the concern, consider in somewhat greater detail the
Rhode Island nightclub fire, referred to earlier. 1 9 On the evening of
February 20, 2003, a rock band, Great White, staged a concert in an
overcrowded nightclub, The Station, in West Warwick, Rhode Island,
using pyrotechnics as part of their act that ignited foam insulation on
the walls of the club. The ensuing fire turned the club into a raging
inferno and led to 100 deaths and almost 200 injuries, many of which
were very serious burn cases. 120 Early estimates of the total prospec-
tive claims in tort ranged in the area of one billion dollars. 121
Tort defendants were not hard to identify. The foam insulation ap-
peared to be highly flammable, which suggested the possibility of suits
against the owners of the nightclub, as well as the company that sup-
plied the foam and its manufacturer. 122 The foam had been in place
for nearly three years, and yet the municipal fire inspector had certi-
fied the club as recently as two months before the fireI23-strongly
suggesting viable claims against the municipality. The band itself, of
course, and its manager, were certain defendants. And in the search
for deep pockets, Clear Channel, the largest operator of radio stations
in the country, which had promoted the concert on its local affiliate
118. See PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 253 (6th ed.
1999).
119. Bombardieri, supra note 27.
120. See Stephen Smith, 10 Weeks After RI. Fire, 100th Victim Dies, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6,
2003, at B1.
121. See Christopher Rowland & Jonathan Saltzman, Suit Filed in Fire as RI. Mulls Aid Fund
Liability Claims Seen Topping $lb, BOSTON GLOBE. Mar. 5, 2003, at Al. See also Stephanie
Ebbert, Liability Coverage in R.I. Rire Put at $10M, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 2003, at B2.
122. Apparently, the supplier's salesman was a neighbor of the owners who allegedly sug-
gested the product when informed about noise complaints from other neighbors. Jonathan Saltz-
man, Purchase of Foam at Club Is Traced, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2003, at B5.
123. Sarah Schweitzer & John McElhenny, 2 Say They Didn't Know of Foam at Club, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2003, at B1.
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and whose disc jockey introduced the band, was named in early
filings.' 2 4
As in the case of September 11th, however, it is one thing to iden-
tify defendants and another to recover compensatory damages in tort.
In the West Warwick case, too, the prospect of insolvency casts a pall
on tort litigation: the owners, band members, and those in the supply
chain of the foam insulation materials all appear to be marginally sol-
vent defendants with limited insurance coverage that might, in fact, be
unavailable in any event if criminal charges are filed. The town's lia-
bility, even if established, is limited by state statute to $100,000 per
plaintiff. 125 It seems unlikely that even by recourse to joinder of de-
fendants, anywhere near the out-of-pocket loss would be recoverable,
let alone claims for intangible loss-consider, once again, the serious
burn cases, along with the prospect of 100 wrongful death claims.
And in the absence of settlement, a protracted litigation process
would almost certainly ensue, during which the plaintiffs would be left
to their own resources, with serious liability issues in doubt against
some defendants, particularly the radio station and foam
manufacturer.
I discuss the West Warwick case in some detail as a stand-in for the
kinds of catastrophic events-put aside natural disasters-that occur,
seemingly at random, in the course of everyday life. Indeed, a not
entirely dissimilar nightclub disaster had occurred in Chicago, with a
substantial number of fatalities, less than a month earlier. 126 The West
Warwick victims were innocent parties who, like the victim class in
terrorist-related incidents or instances of violent crime, are highly un-
likely to realize anywhere near full recovery in the tort system. But
they are not victims of criminal violence, let alone terrorist activities.
Should it matter? Should it matter if they were the innocent victims
of a runaway car plowing through an outdoor street market? 2 7
Bereavement will not serve as an adequate discriminating principle.
Presumably, communal sympathy extends to the West Warwick fire
victims in full measure, as it does to victims of violent crimes. Nor will
bereavement provide an inclusive principle that stops at the victims of
human error once one considers the innocent and destitute victims of
personal injury from a natural disaster.
124. See Jonathan Saltzman, R.L Fire Victims' Lawyers Eye Firm Suits Expected To Name
Radio Station's Owner, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2003, at B1.
125. Rowland & Saltzman, supra note 121.
126. Stampede at E2; Fiction and Fact, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2003, at C26.
127. See Joel Rubin et al., Car Plows Through Crowd in Santa Monica, Killing 9, L.A. TIMES,
July 17, 2003, at 1 (Another victim died the next day and more than fifty were injured in this
incident.).
[Vol. 53:769
2003] CIRCUMSCRIBED RESPONSE OR MODEL? 803
In the end, I am not seeking to raise the neglected banner of Jer-
emiah Smith and propose either a rollback of all no-fault schemes or
an extension to create a New Zealand-type comprehensive no-fault
system. 28 But I do think that normative reservations-that is, the dif-
ficulty in finding a conceptually satisfying rationale for incremental
extensions of benefit recipients beyond September 11th victims-
merge with realpolitik considerations to explain why it is so difficult to
displace or radically diminish the role of tort as our default system,
inadequate as it may sometimes be, in addressing every manner of
personal injury from accidental or intended harm.
128. On the New Zealand system, see Todd, supra note 54.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:769
